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OPTIMIZING REGULATION FOR AN
OPTIMIZING ECONOMY
Cary Coglianese*
Much economic activity in the United States today emanates from technological
advances that optimize through contextualization. Innovations as varied as
Airbnb and Uber, fintech firms, and precision medicine are transforming major
sectors in the economy by customizing goods and services as well as refining
matches between available resources and interested buyers. The technological
advances that make up the optimizing economy create new challenges for
government oversight of the economy. Traditionally, government has overseen
economic activity through general regulations that aim to treat all individuals
equally; however, in the optimizing economy, business is moving in the direction
of greater individualization, not generalization. An ever more optimizing
economy therefore demands an increasingly smart, optimizing system of
regulatory oversight. To ensure that government can properly balance policy
goals in the new economy, steps need to be taken now to enhance the
technological and analytical sophistication of the regulatory workforce, improve
government’s information technology infrastructure, build stronger and more
complete collections of data, and draw on policy lessons from other periods of
technological innovations. In the optimizing economy, government regulators
will continue to play a crucial role in protecting the public from market failures,
but, to fulfill that role, government will need to follow the private sector’s lead
and build up its own capacity for optimization.
*Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Political Science; Director, Penn Program on
Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

2

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Nov. 2018

INTRODUCTION
Across a range of sectors, economic activity in the United States today
increasingly derives from technological advances that facilitate the use of
resources in ever more marginally effective and efficient ways. Rather than
exploiting new resources altogether, many of the most captivating
innovations in today’s economy instead deploy technology to optimize the
production or allocation of existing resources, goods, and services.
Consider several seemingly disparate examples. So-called sharingeconomy firms like Uber and Airbnb find transformational ways to allocate
to willing buyers otherwise under-used resources, such as private cars and
extra bedrooms. Marketing firms rely more than ever on data mining to make
highly targeted pitches to consumers, while supply-chain and delivery system
optimization has streamlined manufacturing and retail markets. Major
advances in health care now travel under the banner of “precision medicine,”
with health care professionals using sophisticated genetic screening and other
data analysis to target treatments even more effectively to individual patients.
Fintech firms promise to deliver financial products more accurately designed
and priced to reflect underlying borrower risks and thus expand access to
capital. These and other changes across the economy signal an important
trend toward using technology to contextualize in ways that make possible
more efficient uses of available resources.1
The emergence of such an optimizing economy holds important
implications for public policy. Government must be able to keep up with
fast-changing technological developments in order both to fulfill its
important responsibilities to protect the public and to keep from impeding
socially valuable changes in the economy. Just as the end of horse-andbuggy days meant that local governments needed to purchase cars for police
officers to enforce speed limits on the roads, so too must regulatory agencies
of all kinds adapt and respond to an increasingly technologically advanced
society. An ever optimizing economy depends on an equally ever
optimizing regulatory system. Government will not only fail to fulfill its
important responsibilities if it cannot keep pace with private-sector
innovation, but lagging governmental capacity also risks contributing to
counterproductive barriers in private innovation, through blunt, ineffectual
regulation. Policymakers from both ends of the political spectrum should
be able to unite behind efforts to optimize regulation, taking steps to
strengthen governmental capacity and improve its efficiency to match better
the most significant trends toward optimization in the private sector and to
ensure sustainable economic growth.
1

For further discussion of these trends, see infra Part I.
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I. THE OPTIMIZING ECONOMY
Economic growth depends on finding optimal outcomes for society. In
this general sense, the idea of optimization is hardly new. The American economy
has long benefited from entrepreneurial efforts to optimize business activity, such
as when assembly-line methods dramatically improved manufacturing efficiency
around the turn of the last century.2 What is different today is how technology
increasingly achieves optimization by enhanced precision in matching goods and
services to individual preferences and needs. Today’s optimization is often
marked by a leap forward in individualization, as well as on a reliance on big data
and advanced analytics to support greater contextualization and distributed
activity. Major innovations with these characteristics are already starting to
disrupt major sectors of the economy, including transportation, energy, health
care, and manufacturing. More looms on the horizon.3
The transportation service behemoth, Uber, may provide the most
salient example of the kind of disruption that the new optimizing model can
create. Uber and, to a lesser extent, Lyft are transforming transportation
services throughout the nation’s metropolitan areas by giving everyone with
a smartphone the ability to find a driver willing to take them where they want
to go. These companies are built on digital and networking technology that
improves the allocation of existing resources by matching people who need
transportation with people who have vehicles and time available.
In this same way, other so-called sharing-economy firms also make better
use of resources that would otherwise go under-utilized. Airbnb, for example,
matches homes and apartments that property owners have available with
people who want a place to stay. In New York City alone, 416,000 guests took
advantage of Airbnb from August 2012 to July 2013, which, by one estimate,
translated into a drop in rental of one million hotel rooms during that period.4
2

ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF
LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 557 (2016) (noting how “[t]he assembly line, together with
electric-powered tools, utterly transformed manufacturing” in the early 1900s).
3
Many of these economic changes bear affinities with what Jeremy Rifkin describes as the “zero
marginal cost society.” JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET
OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM (2015).
4
Laura Kusisto, Airbnb Cites its Role in City, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/airbnb-cites-its-role-in-city-1382405272 (citing a recent survey that found that Airbnb cost
the New York hotel industry one million dollars in lost room nights over a period of eleven
months); Jeremy Rifkin, The Rise of the Sharing Economy, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://
articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/06/opinion/la-oe-rifkin-airbnb-20140406 [https://perma.cc/68MM
-G5DP] (citing the same survey). A study of Airbnb’s impact on the hotel sector in Texas found
that the entrance of Airbnb into this market reduced hotel prices, as well as contributed to up
to a 10 percent decline in revenue for incumbent hotels. Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the
Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 1, 16 (Boston Univ.
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The optimizing economy is broader than just sharing-economy firms.
Conventional retail business also has been shaped dramatically by optimization.
eBay optimizes retail sales by matching people who have items to sell with
customers who want them. Amazon and Netflix use machine-learning to match
customers better with products they likely desire. When customers go online to
shop today, they now see displayed a variety of products identified as likely to
interest them in particular. Facebook and other social media firms provide data
to support still more sophisticated micro-targeted retail marketing.5
Similar strategies that optimize through individualization are starting
to transform medicine.6 Lung cancer treatments, for example, can now be
customized based upon the identification of specific individual genes.7 This
movement toward so-called precision medicine is also facilitated by
sophisticated data analysis of health records—somewhat akin to what
Amazon and Netflix do with consumer purchasing data. The national shift to
electronic medical records will only enhance future health care delivery based
on machine learning and more precisely targeted treatments.8
Retailers like Amazon not only optimize through more individualized
marketing, but they also have significantly optimized their supply chain
management, inventory control, and product delivery systems. Overall,
e-commerce businesses optimize retail space, as webpages take the place of
physical stores and showrooms. But even with its warehouse storage, Amazon has
Sch. Of Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, Nov. 18, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898.
5
See, e.g., TOM AGAN, SILENT MARKETING: MICRO-TARGETING 3 (Penn, Schoen & Berland
Assoc.’s eds., 2007), http://gaia.adage.com/images/random/microtarget031207.pdf (“[Microtargeting] combines attitudes, available consumer data and demographics to find like-minded
people . . . and predict what they will do”); Bernard Marr, Big Data: A Game Changer in the
Retail Sector, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/11/10/
big-data-a-game-changer-in-the-retail-sector/#6bb069a59f37 [https://perma.cc/T2VB-YFME]
(stating that big data analytic tools are being used to predict retail trends, optimize pricing,
determine where demand will be, and identify interested buyers). Retail political campaigning
has also been transformed by predictive analytics, big data, and microtargeting. See BRUCE I.
NEWMAN, THE MARKETING REVOLUTION IN POLITICS: WHAT RECENT U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS CAN TEACH US ABOUT EFFECTIVE MARKETING 38 (2016) (explaining how
campaign strategists have used micro-targeting to “break down the marketplace of voters into
segments that were likely to be influenced by particular advertising strategies”).
6
See generally J. Larry Jameson & Dan L. Longo, Precision Medicine—Personalized,
Problematic, and Promising, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2229 (2015); see also Francis S. Collins &
Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793 (2015)
(discussing the benefits of precision medicine’s individualized, molecular approach to cancer).
7
See generally Reinhard Buettner et al., Lessons Learned from Lung Cancer Genomics: The Emerging Concept of Individualized Diagnostics and Treatment, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1858 (2013).
8
See Sam Hawgood et al., Precision Medicine: Beyond the Inflection Point, 7 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1 (2015) (explaining how precision medicine relies on “massive data networks
that access, aggregate, integrate, and analyze information from huge patient cohorts”).
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proven itself a physical manifestation of the optimizing economy. Its inventory
is stored not by product type, but instead by the precise size and shape of every
item the company sells. Each item is given an identifying number and measured,
and then complex computer algorithms direct where and how those items should
be stacked based on physical dimensions—with the result that Amazon has at
least doubled product storage rates over earlier inventory management systems.9
The nation’s congested highways represent a similar space-optimization
challenge. Google’s self-driving cars, while still in the earliest stages, portend a
transportation future that eventually could optimize time and energy.10 Once
everyone has a self-driving car, slowdowns caused by accidents or by drivers
trying to cut ahead in exit lines could be dramatically reduced. Optimizing the
transportation system to reduce congestion could deliver important productivity
gains as well as make people’s lives markedly happier.11 In addition, when cars
start to do all the driving, human occupants may be able to focus their attention
away from the road to other more productive uses of travel time.
The future also may bring a highly distributed system of energy
production built on solar panels and, to a smaller extent, micro-generators.
Already these kinds of distributed energy technologies are being put into ever
increasing use. With the prices for solar cells dropping dramatically,
individuals are now not only powering their own homes, but also seeking to
sell excess energy back to the grid. Full implementation of distributed energy
production will depend ultimately on advances in energy storage technology;
however, the prospect of using currently untapped roof space in cities around
the country to produce energy holds significant optimizing potential.12
9

CBS News, Amazon's Jeff Bezos Looks to the Future (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.
com/news/amazons-jeff-bezos-looks-to-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/DYC4-2C2M] (quoting
Amazon vice president Dave Clark that “we have computers and algorithmic work that tells
people the areas of the building that have the most space to put product in that's coming in
at that time” and noting that “Amazon has become so efficient with its stacking, it can now
store twice as many goods in its centers as it did five years ago”); Will Knight, Inside
Amazon’s Warehouse Human-Robot Symbiosis, MIT TECH. REV. (July 7, 2015), https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/538601/inside-amazons-warehouse-human-robot-symbiosis/
[https://perma.cc/25GS-6NMY] (noting that “Amazon’s robotic shelves allow more products to
be packed into a tighter space”).
10
See Bernard Marr, Key Milestones Of Waymo - Google's Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Sept.
21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/09/21/key-milestones-of-waymogoogles-self-driving-cars/#1977ba265369 [https://perma.cc/JB6J-XQQH] (discussing Google’s
self-driving car project, Waymo).
11
See Ike Brannon & Mike Gorman, How Investment in Transportation Infrastructure Boosts
Productivity, THE HILL (Sept. 23, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/transportation/
254601-how-investment-in-transportation-infrastructure-boosts [https://perma.cc/PF8C-N83C]
(explaining how congestion can have a significant effect on manufacturing productivity).
12
For an overview, see generally Tom Baker et al., Distributed Energy: A Disruptive Force,
BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP 1 (2014).
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These are but some of the more prominent examples of the emerging
optimizing economy. They reveal how significant parts of the economy’s
trajectory will be influenced by optimization, and they illustrate optimization’s
three main features: customization or individualization; the use of machine
learning and other sophisticated forms of data analysis; and the reliance on
distributed resources, such as data or distributed energy. These three characteristics underlie the great promise the optimizing economy holds for improving
society—but they also create major challenges for government regulation.
II. CHALLENGES FOR REGULATION
At its core, the optimizing economy is based on contextualizing: doing a
better job in matching or otherwise finding ways to tap into and exploit smaller,
more distributed, but previously underused, resources. And yet, therein lies the
fundamental conundrum for government. Governments do not do so well with
contextualizing. Indeed, they are generally not even in that business.
Lawmaking, for example, is the business of establishing rules, which are, by
definition, generalizations, not context-specific judgments.13 And in the
enforcement and implementation of laws, government bureaucracies aim to treat
people equally—by treating everyone the same.14 Even if government does not
always achieve this equal-treatment aspiration in practice, the orientation toward
standardization still persists throughout government and resists movement
toward customization. The upshot is a growing mismatch between the private
and public sectors, a gulf not just between private interests and the public
interest, but a chasm in methods and capacities. Entrepreneurs increasingly aim
at greater precision, while government regulators continue to operate through
broad generalizations and standard operating procedures.
The growing gulf in optimization propensity and skill between the
private and public sectors should concern anyone, no matter one’s political
philosophy. It may seem that calling attention to the optimization mismatch fits
most naturally with a critique of regulation as a burdensome barrier to innovation.
After all, when state and local government officials invoke existing regulations
to resist disruptive innovations—such as when localities have enacted laws that
protect incumbent taxicab businesses by placing restrictions on Uber and
Lyft’s networking dispatch services15—that resistance fits into a narrative of
13

See Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Regulation by Generalization, 1 REG. &
GOV. 68, 69 (2007) (explaining how rules inherently depend on generalizations).
14
Max Weber considered adherence to general rules a defining characteristic of bureaucracy.
MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 214-216 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, trans. 1946).
15
See Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft are Getting Pushback from Municipalities All Over the
US, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-push
back-from-municipalities-all-over-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/D2K8-UGSU] (discussing lawmakers’ efforts to thwart Uber and Lyft’s expansion plans).
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regulatory stagnancy. But those who reject the critique of regulation as an
unjustified drag on business and who, instead, worry that regulation is
insufficiently protective of the public, ought also to be concerned about the
optimization mismatch. New businesses and business practices, after all, bring
with them new and different risks. If nothing else, the very newness of products
and processes in the optimizing economy creates uncertainty about their impact
on others and uncertainty over their quality. Think of how cybersecurity as a
major policy problem simply did not exist twenty years ago.
But there is more than just the newness of optimizing innovations.
Innovation by optimization actually may make hazards to the public harder
to detect and prevent. Precision drugs, for example, have to be manufactured
to more exacting standards if they are to be effective—which itself makes
government’s job in overseeing product quality that much harder. Moreover,
the conventional standards by which government tests new drugs for safety
and efficacy may prove ill-equipped for an era of precision medicine, as more
targeted formulas and treatment protocols necessarily reduce the sample sizes
upon which drug testing’s statistical analysis depends.16
The optimizing economy’s penchant for distributing, as well as
customizing, also may mean there could be many new sites of distinct harm
that government will need to monitor. With the advent of 3D printing, for
example, any individual with the necessary technology and know-how could
begin to manufacture any number of products—even, potentially, new forms
of biological substances or various kinds of dangerous materials.17 The need
for smarter, more sophisticated monitoring capacity by government seems
only likely to increase.
And yet, government also needs to tread carefully when confronting
optimizing innovations, because even if they hold risks, they also hold the
potential for making significant improvements in society. In the face of
prospects for significantly improved health outcomes from precision med16

For a recent survey of regulatory challenges presented by precision medicine, see Lin-Chau
Chang & Thomas E. Colonnab, Recent Updates and Challenges on the Regulation of Precision
Medicine: The United States in Perspective, 96 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 41 (2018).
17
See, e.g., Robert J. Morrison et al., Regulatory Considerations in the Design and Manufacturing of Implantable 3D-Printed Medical Devices, 8 CLIN. & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 594, 595
(2015) (describing a 3D-printed bioresorbable implantable device used to treat life-threatening
disease); European Commission, The Disruptive Nature of 3D Printing 3 (Jan. 2017), https://ec.
europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/monitor/sites/default/files/DTM_The%20disruptive%20
nature%20of%203D%20printing%20v1.pdf (“[S]ome 3D biomedical systems are already
capable of printing cells, proteins and organs.”); Richard Matthews, Proposed New Regulations
for 3D Printed Medical Devices Must Go Further, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 8, 2018),
http://theconversation.com/proposed-new-regulations-for-3d-printed-medical-devices-mustgo-further-90314 [https://perma.cc/V9VQ-U2CC] (“As the costs of 3D printing have reduced,
patients are now able to manufacture their own prosthetics at home . . . .”).
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icine, for instance, drug regulators charged with ensuring safety and efficacy
of new products also must not impede the development of better medicines.
What society needs is an ever more optimizing government to come closer to
matching an ever more optimizing economy.
At some fundamental level, of course, regulatory officials always
have had to confront a tradeoff between squelching technological
innovation and overlooking new risks.18 Indeed, balancing the benefits of
government regulations with their costs is itself an optimization problem—
although it has been one for which the federal government has only in the
last few decades created robust institutional processes to try to solve.19 Yet,
no matter how well or poorly the federal government has reconciled
regulatory benefits and costs in the past, in the years to come it will only
become harder to regulate well. As the regulation of precision medicine
illustrates, identifying and delivering regulatory benefits will become more
complicated in the face of growing complexity and the contextualized
nature of many business enterprises. Regulatory problems are likely to be
subtler and much harder to detect overall. They likely will be more dynamic
too, emerging from systems of economic transactions that are moving
quickly—sometimes across borders.20
Regulators in the optimizing economy will also face challenges in
controlling regulatory costs, potentially finding it more important than ever
to minimize cumulative and overlapping regulatory burdens. According to
the Office of the Federal Register, the size of the federal rulebook has grown
nearly 2000 percent since 1950.21 Although it is not clear whether this
growth is itself a problem—compared to what should 2000 percent be
18

Tradeoffs are endemic to regulatory and other public policy decision-making. See
generally RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John
D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1997); GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC
CHOICES (1978).
19
And, even then, the standards under which the institutional process of creating and
reviewing benefit–cost analysis of major new regulations have shifted to some degree. In
1981, President Reagan formalized White House review of major regulations, directing in
Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), that the benefits of regulation should
generally “outweigh” their costs—a formal expression of optimization. In 1993, however,
President Clinton replaced the Reagan executive order with one of his own (Exec. Order No.
12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993)) that has been retained by subsequent presidents
and that requires, instead of full optimization, that regulations’ benefits “justify” their costs.
20
See, e.g., IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (Cary
Coglianese et al. eds., 2010) (“The sheer volume of international trade creates a vast and
complex network of the sources of safety problems”).
21
OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (TOTAL VOLUMES AND
PAGES 1950–2014), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2015/05/Code-of-Federal-Reg
ulations-Total-Pages-and-Volumes-1938-2014.pdf.
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judged?—such growth does at least suggest the potential for increased
cumulative regulatory costs. Michael Mandel and Diana Carew have
argued that accumulating regulations bring more than just increased costs
to businesses; they also may increase the possibility of undesirable
interactions between regulations or potentially decrease the amount of
upper-level management attention devoted to further business optimization
and growth.22
In some existing areas of regulation, such as food safety and financial
services, concern persists that regulations already overlap with each other
or are administered by different government agencies in an uncoordinated
fashion.23 Such concerns seem only likely to grow in an optimizing economy.
Uber, after all, faces disputes today over whether its drivers fall into the
category of employees, who are subject to labor law protections, or the
category of contractors, who are not.24 Other firms offering optimizing
innovations may find that they fit poorly into existing regulatory categories
or even cut across several categories. Moreover, as firms increasingly build
optimizing business strategies, the relative importance of overlapping
regulatory authorities to their success may only increase. Overlapping
jurisdictions and the accretion of regulation layered upon regulation may
have been more easily accommodated in a “satisficing” era than in an
optimizing one.25
III. OPTIMIZING REGULATION
The growing mismatch between complex contextualization in the
economy and an accumulated set of rule generalizations in the government
may be one of most significant challenges for governance of the U.S. economy
in the decades to come. What might be done to bring the U.S. federal government and its regulatory system into greater alignment with emerging
innovations in the economy, so as to regulate more smartly an economy that is
itself only growing smarter?
22

Michael Mandel & Diana G. Carew, Regulatory Improvement Commission: A PoliticallyViable Approach to U.S. Regulatory Reform, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. 1, 3 (2013).
23
See Cary Coglianese, There’s an Easy Way to Untangle Regulatory Knots, L.A. TIMES
(March 31, 2015, 6:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0401-coglianeseregulations-20150401-story.html [https://perma.cc/UWP3-4CTC] (recommending a strategy
for government to reduce regulatory overlap).
24
See Katy Steinmetz, Why the California Ruling on Uber Should Frighten the Sharing
Economy, TIME (June 17, 2015), http://time.com/3924941/uber-california-labor-comm
ission-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/78UQ-E2NM] (discussing a 2015 ruling from the California
Labor Commission in favor of an Uber driver seeking classification as an employee).
25
Herbert Simon coined the term “satisfice.” Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the
Structure of the Environment, 63. PSYCH. REV. 129, 129 (1956).
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First and foremost, an optimizing regulatory system will need an
analytically sophisticated workforce.26 Since at least the 1980s, though, it has
been clear that the federal government confronts a shortfall in talented
managers and leaders. As Paul Volcker’s National Commission on Public
Service noted then, “too many of the best of the nation’s senior executives
are ready to leave government, and not enough of its most talented young
people are willing to join.”27 Today, the federal government is facing the
prospect of more than a third of the existing federal workforce reaching
retirement age by 2020—a significant and sudden decline in needed human
capital.28 But as critical and monumental of a challenge as it is simply to
maintain a federal workforce with mission-critical skills, the need today is no
longer just to stem the tide of out-flow from the ranks of governmental
service.29 Government needs a new type of talent in-flow as well, one that
brings even greater analytic capacities to the oversight of the optimizing
economy.30 The federal government needs human analytic capacity capable
of understanding, tracking, and responding to new risks and new business
practices in ways that do not impede productive innovations for society. If
one of the answers to declining American competitiveness is, as Michael
Porter and colleagues have recently suggested in the context of regulating
unconventional oil and gas development,31 the greater use of performance26

See Cary Coglianese, Regulatory Excellence as ‘People Excellence,’ REG. REV. (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.theregreview.org/2015/10/23/coglianese-people-excellence/ [https://perma.cc/2KR
7-RS94] (arguing that regulatory quality depends on the quality of regulatory workforces).
27
Paul A. Volcker, Preface to the NAT’L COMMISSION ON PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR
AMERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1989).
28
Federal Workforce: Sustained Attention to Human Capital Leading Practices Can Help
Improve Agency Performance: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 115th Cong. 3-4 (2017) (testimony of Robert Goldenkoff, Director of Strategic
Issues), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684709.pdf.
29
For broader perspectives on the vital need for maintaining a competent federal workforce, see
JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., BRING BACK THE BUREAUCRATS (2014); DONALD F. KETTL, ESCAPING
JURASSIC GOVERNMENT: HOW TO RECOVER AMERICA’S LOST COMMITMENT TO COMPETENCE
(2016); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK (2018); PAUL C. LIGHT, A GOVERNMENT ILL
EXECUTED: THE DECLINE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE AND HOW TO REVERSE IT (2009).
30
Among the needed analytic capacities must obviously be an understanding of and facility
with machine learning and other big data analytic techniques that support optimizing trends
in the private sector. But an analytically sophisticated workforce must also possess the habits
of mind and analytic tools needed to keep learning over time. For accessible discussions of
key modes of learning and inference, see RICHARD E. NISBETT, MINDWARE: TOOLS FOR
SMART THINKING 149-170 (2015); Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis of Administrative
Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1115–1119 (2002); Cary Coglianese, Learning What Works
in Regulation, REG. REVIEW (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/03/07/
coglianese-rubin-learning-what-works-regulation/.
31
MICHAEL E. PORTER, DAVID S. GEE & GREGORY J. POPE, AMERICA’S UNCONVENTIONAL
ENERGY OPPORTUNITY 1, 2, 7 (2015).
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based and management-based approaches to regulation, government will
need to have the distinctive human infrastructure in place to establish and
implement these approaches in ways that actually work well.32
Second, the federal government’s information technology infrastructure
needs to rise to the task. “Amid all the uncertainty about government’s future,”
notes Donald Kettl, “there is one sure thing.”33 That “sure thing” is that
government “will operate in a world of increasing technology and data.”34 Yet
unfortunately, too many federal computer systems are antiquated.35 As recently as
2016, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that threequarters of federal IT spending each year goes to support old “legacy systems,”
many of which “are becoming increasingly obsolete” due to “outdated software
languages and hardware parts that are unsupported.”36 Not only do such aging
systems need to be upgraded, but still more challenging will be finding ways to
combine databases across the federal government in order to use machine learning
and “big data” analysis to make government smarter. New analytic tools can give
regulatory agencies an ability to optimize their human resources better too. For
example, an analysis conducted at the Penn Program on Regulation has shown that
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration could improve its
targeting of limited regulatory inspection resources dramatically by combining
and applying machine learning to disparate governmental and private-sector
datasets. In an economy increasingly propelled by machine learning and other
optimizing analytics in the private sector, it makes sense that regulatory officials
need to rely on these techniques too.37 Some agencies, like the U.S. Environmental
32
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33
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34
Id.
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Protection Agency, are starting to consider how new remote sensing and other
technology can be deployed for improved regulatory monitoring.38 But the
government has many miles still to travel in order to use digital technology and
artificial intelligence to catch up with the private sector.39
Finally, an optimizing government should learn from the past in order to
chart a better path forward. Society has faced innovations and their associated
risks before. Yet too often in the past, new technologies have been given a
regulatory “free pass,” emerging with little government oversight but leaving
public harms in their wake—as with much industrial development in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Or, at the other extreme, new
innovations have sometimes been blocked altogether. Both approaches are
decidedly non-optimizing—even clunky—in the context of today’s economy.40
And yet, remnants of these approaches still persist in public policy responses to
recent innovations in the economy. Perhaps one of the more salient examples
comes from the energy sector, where technological advances have enabled firms
to find natural gas in literally fine-grained ways by using hydraulic fracturing—
or fracking—to extract previously trapped energy resources. On the one hand,
the federal government has exempted unconventional natural gas development
entirely from certain environmental regulations under the so-called Halliburton
amendment.41 On the other hand, several states, including New York, have gone
to the other extreme and have imposed complete bans on this method of energy
extraction.42 For many innovations in the optimizing economy, the government
can afford neither to give a complete regulatory free pass in the face of new risks,
nor to ban outright otherwise valuable new business models and practices. For
example, in the face of a variety of concerns about the harmful effects of social
media platforms, whether in violating personal privacy, propagating falsehoods,
that machine learning has been exploited in the private sector, its use holds potentially great
value to government agencies.”).
38
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or facilitating foreign interference in elections, the appropriate response is surely
not doing nothing—nor is it to outlaw such platforms altogether.43 Government’s appropriate response to the risks presented by most innovations will
presumably lie somewhere between inaction and overbroad regulation. But
making the optimal choice between these two extremes will depend in the first
instance on the collection and analysis of sound information by regulators. It will
also require responsible, ongoing regulatory vigilance.44 Smart regulation can
only optimize by regulating just enough and in the right ways when regulators
are themselves smart and attentive to the need to find the proper balance.45
CONCLUSION
What stands in the way of more optimal regulation? Significant resource
constraints, bureaucratic and political entrenchment, and a status quo bias—all
of these are and likely will remain major impediments for some time to come.
But the barriers need to be confronted and overcome. Regulatory challenges in
an optimizing economy certainly will be no easier than ones in the past; however,
they will prove decidedly insurmountable if nothing is done to counteract the
growing mismatch between governmental capacity and private-sector innovation. Policy action must become smarter than ever before.
The path forward to expanded economic growth will involve new, creative
forms of optimization. Indeed, an American economy based on natural resources
and labor abundance may already be on the decline, and, if so, the economy of the
future will, by necessity, be built on optimizing what is left. With significant
portions of the economy already based on an imperative to optimize, and with
businesses rapidly advancing in precision and analytic sophistication, government
will only be able to fulfill its responsibilities by becoming more optimizing itself.
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